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INTRODUCTION:
Admiral Halsey, as we have seen, proposed on 13 September to bypass the Paulus, but Admiral Nimitz did not accept this suggestion. He felt that Peleliu and Kossol Passage were needed as staging points for Leyte, and Wilkerson"s expedition was already at sea and within two days of the objective when Halsey"s proposition was put to him. From hindsight it seems probable that STALEMATE II should have been countermanded. It was useful, but hardly worth the expenditure of 1,950 American lives. 1 
Samuel Eliot Morrison, Leyte
Some 1,950 American lives gone, gone in an operation that may have been avoided, gone because the momentum that carried them to the shores of Peleliu could not be abated.
STALEMATE II was an intensely planned operation that encompassed thousands of individuals, a tremendous amount of equipment, as well as innumerable hours of coordination. Was it in the intense effort to undertake this operation that Admiral Nimitz felt it necessary to carry on as planned instead of taking the advice of his subordinate? Had the detailed planning also considered the potential opportunities presented by Halsey? If Admiral Nimitz had allowed for greater flexibility in his operational design could he have avoided such immense casualties for an island that in the words of a veteran and historian of the conflict "was a convenience, but not a necessity?" 2 The design of major operations develops the mission into tasks; sequenced, phased and synchronized through the intended Line of Operation (LOO) to the objective. Two subordinate operations utilized in fulfilling these tasks are branch and sequel planning.
Within doctrine these methods are coupled together for instruction, yet maintain two distinct meanings in accordance with mission accomplishment. Currently, doctrinally described, branches are often viewed in a myopic, reactive manner, intended to protect the intended LOO. Because of this doctrinal bias, branch planning has not matured within operational design in order to become viewed as a method of exploiting opportunity. Correspondingly, the ability of the JFC to recognize and exploit opportunity through branch planning is not being applied. This failure to recognize opportunity through flexibility is being overlooked due to the current doctrinal definition of a branch, its anemic explanation within doctrine, as well as its minimal application within the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP). With recognition of potential opportunity and the adjustment and minor expansion of steps within JOPP, fully developed branch planning can serve as a potentially lucrative means to achieve operational objectives through direct branch to sequel transition.
This study argues the value of a concept of generating tempo through the direct planning for direct branch to sequel transition utilizing the indirect method of attacking an enemy"s
Center of Gravity (COG), by initially defining the elements of operational design that make up the LOO. Inherent to the LOO is the concept of the branch, in which the doctrinal definition will be critiqued. After discussing these doctrinal applications two distinct possibilities, coupled with historical examples of each, will be offered as alternatives to the classic application of a branch plan. Within each historical example an analysis of the factors of ends, ways, means and risk as well as time, space and force, elements essential to the exploitation of a branch, will be considered. Counterarguments will be discussed from the view of the historical examples and their shortfalls. This examination will conclude with proposed adjustments to the current doctrinal perspectives on the concept of branch planning.
Conclusions will be drawn from the current definitions, doctrine and application. The end state is to offer the JFC a method of viewing opportunities, created through branch plans, as a method for seamless translation to a sequel.
I. THE ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN:
Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, details the elements of operational art and design that are used to formulate and visualize an operation. These elements entail synchronizing the operational objective to a strategic objective, defining decisive points, intermediate objectives, LOOs, sequels and branches.
As defined in doctrinal publications, the strategic military objective supports the overall goal of fulfilling the national strategic objectives. 3 The operational military objective therefore supports both the former and the latter in its accomplishment. In order to accomplish these objectives it is imperative to define the enemy"s Center of Gravity (COG).
How the COG is attacked is formulated by what conditions the JFC determines to end the conflict, and can be by either direct or indirect methods. 4 The COG "comprises the source of power that provides freedom of action, physical strength, and the will to fight," 5 and is broken into three distinct elements; critical capabilities, critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities. 6 Once defined the JFC will assess how he applies assets and capabilities to "exploit [critical] vulnerabilities" through the identification of Decisive Points (DP). 7 Joint Advanced Warfighting School"s "Operational Campaign Primer" states "Objectives and their supporting effects provide the basis for identifying tasks to be accomplished." 8 These "tasks to be accomplished" during a specific operational phase are subsequently translated into DPs which allow the commander to "gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contributes materially to achieving success." 9 During the planning process, as
DPs are identified, forces will be allocated in order to ensure their subsequent seizure (or denial to the enemy, if applicable). As DPs are secured they will subsequently translate into a distinct advantage in the force"s ability to seize and hold an intermediate objective. Figure 2 serves as a graphical example of these concepts.
II. SEQUELS AND BRANCHES:
As considered earlier, intermediate objectives allow for concentration of forces along the LOO in order to begin the next phase, or sequel of the operation. "Sequel plans are developed during execution based on the adjustment of current operations for adjustment to future operations," 15 or to put it another way, sequels are based upon the success or failure of the operation as well as the enemy"s actions up until that point. The concept of sequencing operations became relevant during the Napoleonic period, when it was recognized that "preconditions" needed to be achieved in order to conduct the decisive battle to defeat the enemy. 16 These "pre-conditions" became major operational actions undertaken to achieve a positional or force advantage over the opponent eventually culminating in the demise of the enemy"s combat strength. Major operations during World War II, such as Operation GOODWOOD and COBRA, were sequels to the Normandy landings (Operation NEPTUNE) in order to breakout from the Normandy beachhead and gain maneuver space for future operations. 17 If the sequel to current operations answers the "what"s next" in the operation then the branch answers the "what if" to that same operation. In the view of Liddel-Hart, branches were paths to alternate objectives; the key is to develop a plan that provides opportunity to strike at different points. 18 Joint doctrine, defines a branch as:
The contingency options built into a basic plan. A branch is used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions.
doctrinal publications specifically point out that effort should be made to avoid over planning for these possible eventualities due to the inherent need to focus the vast majority of available planning time into the primary COA. 21 This consideration is inherently associated with the concept of risk, and either the acceptance or mitigation of risk. For example, in
December of 1944, General Eisenhower recognized the weakness inherent to his positions around the Ardennes Forest on the Western Front. He subsequently accepted the risk to his LOO, took action to remove vital logistic elements from the immediate threat, and put in place branch plans with both his 3 rd and 9 th Armies in the event of a German attack. 22 It was the overwhelming German force and speed, coupled with severe weather, which subsequently transformed acceptable risk and moderate planning into full blown crisis response. Armed with this review of existing doctrinal understanding of operational design geometry, this examination will now consider examples of two non-typical branch scenarios that both portray operational flexibility as well as exploitation of opportunity rather than only protecting against risk.
III. BYPASSING PRE-ESTABLISHED DECISIVE POINTS:
The first scenario is the ability of a branch plan to respond to the negated value of pre- 
IV. BRANCH TO SEQUEL TRANSITION:
Another option for broadening the value of branch plans is the opportunity for a branch plan, while in execution, to become the starting point for a planned sequel, ultimately either The end result was that within two weeks over 240,000 prisoners and 2,000 guns were taken as the Soviets completely collapsed under the combined weight of the German forces. 33 The Germans immediately transitioned into offensive operations dictated by Operation BLUE and began the summer offensive on 1 June. This opportunity was recognized for numerous reasons, but two standout the most. First, the German forces were poised to begin their planned offensive operations dictated by Operation BLUE with the overall mission of trapping and destroying Soviet forces by overwhelmingly fast mechanized maneuvers. This example effectively illustrates several points associated with branch to sequel transition. The aforementioned key element of prior planning and preparation was pertinent to the overall success of the operation; however, the Germans were not prescient enough to envision their application in that manner prior to the Soviet attack. What the Germans were perceptive enough to recognize was how the elements of time/space/force could be brought to bear in a situation for which they had not planned for but were flexible enough to exploit.
V. COUNTERARGUMENTS:
First, arguments could be made that further development of branch plans diminishes both economy of force and the emphasis on the chosen COA. In fact, the inherent drawback of branch execution is the reduction of strength along the intended LOO prosecuting the chosen COA, is a drain on all elements of combat and supporting power. The aforementioned branch plans GOODWOOD and COBRA, while attempting to gain operational maneuver space, did not specifically lead to the seizure of the ports of Antwerp, the initial intermediate objective of the Normandy campaign. 34 However, if branch plans are anticipated to occur during the initial planning process, it would behoove the application of some type of deliberate planning at a minimum to exercise options. GOODWOOD and COBRA were planned after the scenario developed, contradicting the ease in which the Allies believed they would enlarge the initial lodgment. setback that elongated the conflict. However, Eisenhower was quick to grasp the opportunity that Hitler had presented him by committing his last operational reserve to an area that was limited in both depth and strategic relevance. 38 Advocating the assumption of unheeded risk is not the theme of this document, rather it is applying the lens of opportunity against that risk. Additionally, if this fact can be recognized early within the planning process then avoidance of the operational surprise that befell the allies in 1944 can be avoided.
Finally, failure to identify adequate branch planning opportunities, evaluated against ends, ways, means, risk as well as time, space, and force effectively allowed Admiral Halsey to lose sight of the operational objective as he pursued Ozawa"s decoy forces during the Battle of Leyte. 39 It is incumbent to view any and all expenditures of combat and supporting power as a means to impact our enemy in an adverse manner, which entails ensuring that opportunities are identified, planned for, approved by the JFC, and promulgated to his subordinate staff.
VI. ANALYSIS:
The aforementioned historical examples illustrated the relevance of recognizing opportunity and its effects in generating tempo. Additionally, they both expounded upon the idea of operational flexibility inherent within a branch plan itself. Both examples emphasized the application of an operational commander"s vision in exploiting opportunity where and when presented. Moreover, the elements of ends, ways, means and risk as well as time, space and force were properly applied in order to reach a decision for implementation.
As previously defined, a branch "aid [s] [in] success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions." 40 First, other than its limit to a single word, opportunity in this scenario may be better defined by its synonyms such as occasion which "suggests the proper time for action," 41 or opening which "is an opportunity affording a good possibility of success." 42 The expansion of the concept gives the JFC a more complete understanding of the possibilities afforded in its action.
Second, it completely separates, by meaning, opportunity with disruptions, explicitly leaving the reader with a belief that opportunity cannot be found within the elements of an enemy"s actions or reactions. Previous historical examples prove this to be incorrect. Further, if it is "based on anticipated events" should not one of those events be an opportunity to bypass or Planning, regurgitate the same theme in regards to branches and add little in the way of the "opportunity" that was stated in its definition.
JP 5-0 outlines the process of implementing operational art and design into the concept of operations utilizing JOPP continues the trend of branch diminishment in its processes.
Currently, within JOPP, during COA war gaming, the planning staff will attempt to identify possible branch scenarios through exercising the selected COA. 46 JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, states that once identified, branch plans become the subject of Crisis Action Planning (CAP) and are no longer formally exercised within the JOPP process until after the publication of the OPORD/OPLAN. 47 Branch plan development is assigned to the J-3, Future Operations cell, after their identification. The J-3 works with the J-5, Future Plans cell, in order to conduct CAP to execute a branch. This is due to the fact that J-5 is responsible for planning sequels and reinforces the concept of current operations affecting sequel transition. However, it also alludes to the fact that branch planning and execution can have a direct influence on future sequels, both when and where they are executed. 48 However, these operations are currently, doctrinally conducted during CAP, hence, after the OPORD or OPLAN has been published and/or during the execution of the chosen COA along the LOO.
Without leaving COA war gaming with a division of branch plans into risk or opportunity categories, the planning staffs are naturally placed in a position where any further planning will be done to protect the already chosen, deliberately planned COA. JP 5-0 emphatically points this out by stating "planning continues during execution, with the initial emphasis on refining the existing plan and producing the OPORD." 49 As seen in the introductory paragraph, the lack of recognition that the plan may be unnecessary, coupled with a sense of inertia to support the current plan, led Admiral Nimitz to approve the landings at Peleliu even after the recommendations of his subordinates to the contrary. This type of reactionary planning can only be broken through the re-education of the branch, it doctrinal application, a change within the steps of branch identification and, most importantly, the leadership and guidance of the JFC.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS:
The first recommendation begins with how doctrine defines the issue. The current definition of a branch must be adjusted in order to develop JFCs who can utilize all tools to exploit opportunity. This will reinforce the current asymmetrical situation that condenses planning timelines and have led to most operations outside of major combat to be labeled contingencies. For that reason, by establishing a new definition of a branch a generation of officers will come to think of it less as a mitigating factor. Instead, realizing that a branch, when critiqued by both, ends, ways, means, and risk as well as time, space and force, the JFC will begin to utilize it as an effective means of economizing force while generating tempo.
Therefore, the following is proposed as a new definition of the branch:
The contingency operation built into a basic plan. A branch is used in order to maximize operational flexibility and economy of force by changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, disruptions caused by enemy actions, and exploiting opportunities inherent to both situations.
While this new definition does not seem a radical departure from the current definition it emphasizes both flexibility and exploitation of opportunity inherent to the concept of branch development. In addition it reinforces to the JFC the principle of economy of force and its diminishing factor when applied to any operation.
Second, adjust doctrine to reflect the application of this new definition in order to begin the process of exploiting opportunity when presented, regardless of method. As explained, branches currently are relegated to an afterthought for the JFC and his staff. Branches must become an element that cannot be overlooked in operational design. Currently, within JP 3-0, the word opportunity is not collocated or associated with how we define or apply a branch. This step would allow the planning staff to assist the JFC in not only identifying risk to the LOO, but reinforces the fact that an enemy reaction is also an opportunity for counteraction capable of developing those elements we cannot account for initially.
Napoleon applied Bourcet"s concept that "every plan of a campaign ought to have several branches and to have been so well thought out that one or another of the said branches cannot fail of success." 51 This concept of being "so well thought out" is missing in the current planning process where a branch plan is assigned to CAP only after the OPORD or OPLAN is completed. By identifying those relevant, opportunistic branch plans early enough, the planning staff allows for greater chance of success to occur once the friction of combat is added.
Currently, we equate the conditions necessary to achieve our intermediate objective by defining DPs; we sequence those decisive points along our LOO and assign resources to their completion. However, in order for previous DPs to remain germane they must continually be assessed in regards to the objective. Therefore, every opportunity must be made within the planning process to develop branch plans that have the potential to be exploited even further either by their ability to mitigate or negate decisive points in order to become direct locations for transition directly into a sequel.
In order for branch to sequel transition to take place the elements of time, space, force must be taken into account. In addition to the time spent in conducting initial planning for such an operation, the JFC must also be able to recognize within a condensed and more than likely chaotic, situation the elements within a branch plan before or during their execution that would possibly lead to initiation of a branch to sequel transition. This time factor also includes how both combat and supporting elements can react to the shift in weight of effort and their ability to deal with the deletion of planned DPs or possibly their omission.
Therefore, it is essential that in the initial planning process, the JFC emphasize to his staff elements as well as subordinate commanders, to not rely upon pre-ordained DPs as planned, and to retain operational flexibility to adjust to both the element of time as well as changes to where, when and how decisive points may be achieved in the fluidity of battle. Within the element of space, the JFC must recognize what he is both gaining and ceding in conducting branch to sequel transition. DPs and intermediate objectives were chosen for a reason, specifically to be able to defeat the enemy COG indirectly through phased sequels. Again, sequels add depth to your operation, so therefore the JFC must initially ask the question does this transition provide the depth needed to begin the sequel initiation. Additionally, can we sequence from possibly a different intermediate objective? Space is also a factor of operational maneuver and the ability to bring to bear all combat power against the enemy. In both the Pacific vignette as well as the Eastern Front we are reminded of combat that was conducted across vast areas. The current JFC will more than likely be presented with smaller operations that do not necessarily offer the maneuver space as historically described, however, the elements of key terrain still remain relevant regardless of size of the battle field.
Finally, the factor of force is a key element conducted in this type of maneuver, specifically its economy and the ability to concentrate forces at the point of transition. This element takes into account both time and space with regards to notifying and moving elements to exploit the opportunity presented. However, it also entails the ceding of any gains made toward planned DPs and intermediate objectives achieved up until that point. It also changes the dynamic of when the JFC estimates he will reach his culminating point of attack and specifically equates to why intermediate objectives are used; in order to concentrate forces (i.e. re-supply and re-orient) for an eventual sequel. Additionally, economy of force, a prevalent factor in any operation, can be stressed by concurrent main effort and branch execution and be even further stretched if forces must be shifted along a LOO in order to exploit a branch.
All three elements, time, space, force, have an effect on how the JFC will view these operations prior to and during the execution of branch plans. The above mentioned points emphasize the need to conduct deliberate planning for possible opportunistic branch plans prior to conducting operations along the LOO. If indeed the elements of time, space, force are balanced against the elements of ends, ways, means, and risk the JFC will be able to provide more prevalent guidance to what branch plans he deems worthy of further deliberate planning and which branch plans would remain within the intent of protecting the decided upon LOO and its geographic elements.
VIII. CONCLUSION:
The lives of 1,950 bear mute testimony to operational inflexibility. Without the necessary changes within the definition, the doctrine and its application within JOPP, the JFC will be unable to fully integrate the inherent advantages of a branch into a flexible operational 
